WILDERNESS, VIRGINIA
May 5TH - 7TH, 1864
Company F, 126th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, suffered the
following casualties during the Battle of Wilderness:
Eli Barrick - Killed May 6, 1864 in Wilderness, Virginia
William Craig - POW on May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Died as a
prisoner on March 12, 1865 in Wilmington, North Carolina
Lewis S. Crawford - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Wounded on
September 21, 1864 at Flint Hill, Virginia - Discharged because of wounds
March 5, 1865
Calvin M. Creighton - Killed May 6, 1864 in Wilderness, Virginia
Alonzo L. DeFord - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Wounded
September 21, 1864 at Flint Hill, Virginia
John L. Dumbleton - Killed May 6, 1864 in Wilderness, Virginia
Robert Figley - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia
John S. Hannum - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Died
of wounds on May 15, 1864
Christian Harsh - POW on May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Died as a
prisoner on November 15, 1864 in Andersonville, Georgia
Samuel Hill - POW on May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Died as a
prisoner on September 20, 1864 in Andersonville, Georgia
Thomas J. Hyatt - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia
William M. Jackson - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia -
Discharged because of wounds on May 14, 1865
Nathaniel McConnell - POW on May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Released
on December 11, 1864 at Charleston, South Carolina - Estimated exchange on
February 15, 1865
Henry S. Moses - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia
James A. Robertson - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia
Jesse W. Shaw - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Discharged
because of wounds on April 26, 1865
John C. Snively - Killed May 6, 1864 in Wilderness, Virginia
Alexander Stuller - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia
Josiah S. Stuller - Killed May 6, 1864 in Wilderness, Virginia
James L. Vanpelt - Wounded May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia
William O. Woods - POW on May 6, 1864 at Wilderness, Virginia - Estimated
exchange on February 15, 1865
Battle Summary:
Wilderness, VA., May 5-7, 1864. Army of the Potomac. On March 9, 1864,
Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general and
placed in command of all the United States armies in the field. The interval
from that time until the 1st of May was spent in planning campaigns, and in
strengthening, organizing and equipping the several armies in the different
military districts. Grant remained with the Army of the Potomac, which was
under the immediate command of Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, and which had for
its objective the destruction of the Confederate army under command of Gen.
Robert E. Lee. On May 1, the Army of the Potomac lay along the north side of
the Rapidan river and was organized as follows: The 2nd Corps Maj.Gen. W. S.
Hancock commanding, was composed of four divisions; the 1st commanded by
Brig.-Gen. F. C. Barlow, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, the 3rd by Maj.-
Gen. D. B. Birney, and the 4th by Brig-Gen. Gershom Mott. The 5th corps,
commanded by Maj.-Gen. G. K Warren, consisted of four divisions,
respectively commanded by Brig Gens. Charles Griffin, J. C. Robinson, S. W.
Crawford and J. S. Wadsworth. The 6th corps under command of Maj.-Gen. John
Sedgwick included the three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. H. G. Wright,
G. W. Getty and James B. Ricketts. The 9th Corps, Maj.-Gen. A. E. Burnside
commanding, was composed of four divisions, each of which was commanded by a
brigadier-general-the 1st by T. G. Stevenson, the 2nd by R B. Potter, the
3rd by O. B. Willcox and the 4th by Edward Ferrero. The cavalry corps, under
command of Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, consisted of three divisions, the 1st
commanded by Brig.-Gen. T. A. Torbert, the 2nd by Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer
and the 3rd by Brig-Gen. J. H. Wilson. With the 2nd corps was the artillery
brigade Under Col John C. Tidball; the artillery of the 5th corps was in
charge of Col. C. S. Wainwright; that of the 6th Corps Under Col. C. H.
Tompkins, and the artillery reserve, composed of Kitching's, J. A. Tompkins'
and Burton's brigades, was commanded by Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Burnside
had 14 light and 2 heavy batteries. During the campaign the 18th corps,
commanded by Maj.-Gen. W. F. Smith, was transferred from the Army of the
James to the Army of the Potomac. This corps was composed of three
divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gens. W. T. H. Brooks, Godfrey Weitzel and E.
W. Hinks, and the cavalry division Under Brig-Gen. August V. Kautz.
Lee's Army-the Army of Northern Virginia-consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
corps, respectively commanded by Lieut.-Gens. James Longstreet, R. S. Ewell
and A. P. Hill, and the cavalry corps of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart.
Longstreet's corps included the divisions of Kershaw and Field, and the
artillery brigade under Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander. Ewell's corps was made
up of the divisions of Early, Edward Johnson and Rodes, and the artillery
brigade of Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long Hill's Corps was composed of the divisions
of R. H. Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, and his artillery was commanded by Col.
R. L. Walker. Stuart's cavalry embraced three divisions, commanded by Wade
Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and the horse artillery Under Maj.
R. P. Chew. The Union army numbered about 120,000 men of all arms, exclusive
of Smith's corps. Lee's army numbered about 61,000 not including the Forces
Under Beauregard on the Petersburg lines and the troops left in the defenses
of Richmond, about 30,000 in all. Ewell's corps was intrenched along the
south side of the Rapidan, his right resting near Morton's Ford A Short
distance above the mouth of Mine run. The upper half of the intrenched line
was held by Hill's corps, the left extending to Barnett's Ford, about 5
Miles West of the Orange & Alexandria railroad. Longstreet's command was at
Gordonsville, the junction of the Orange & Alexandria and the Virginia
Central railroads. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House, about half
way between Longstreet and the line along the Rapidan, from which point he
could easily communicate with his corps commanders, and detachments of
cavalry watched the various fords and bridges along the river.
Grant's plan was to Cross the Rapidan at the fords below the Confederate
line of intrenchments move rapidly around Lee's right flank and force him
either to give battle or retire to Richmond. As soon as this movement was
well under Way, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was to advance up
the James River from Fortress Monroe and Attack Richmond from the south. The
region known as the Wilderness, through which the Army of the Potomac was to
move, lies between the Rapidan the north and the Mattapony on the south. It
is about 12 Miles Wide from north to south and some 16 Miles in extent from
east to West. Near the center stood the Wilderness tavern, 8 Miles West of
Chancellorsville and 6 Miles South of Culpeper Mine Ford on the Rapidan. A
short distance West of the tavern the plank road from ermanna Ford crossed
the Orange & Fredericksburg turnpike, and then running southeast for about 2
Miles intersected the Orange plank road near the Hickman farmhouse. The
Brock Road Left the Orange & Fredericksburg pike about a mile east of the
tavern and ran southward to Spottsylvania Court House, Via Todd's Tavern.
The first iron furnaces in the United States were established in the
Wilderness, the original growth of timber had been cut off to furnish fuel
for the furnaces, and the surface, much broken by ravines, ridges and old
ore beds, was covered by a second growth of pines, scrub-oaks, etc., so
dense in places that it was impossible to see a man at a distance of 50
yards. Between the Orange plank road and the Fredericksburg pike ran a
little stream called Wilderness run, and north of the latter road was Flat
run the general direction of both streams being northeast toward the Rapidan
into which they emptied. On the Orange plank road, about 4 Miles southwest
from the Wilderness tavern, was Parker's Store.
From the Confederate signal station on Clark's Mountain, Near the right of
Ewell's position, the Federal camps could be plainly seen. On May 2nd Lee,
accompanied by several of his generals, made a personal observation, saw the
commotion in the Union lines, and rightly conjectured that an early movement
of some kind was in contemplation. He accordingly directed his officers to
hold their commands in readiness to move against the flank of the Federal
army whenever the orders were given from the signal station. It was on this
Same Day that Meade, by Grant's instructions, issued his orders for the
advance. Knowing that his every movement was observed by the enemy, he
determined to Cross the Rapidan during the night. At midnight on the 3rd the
5th and 6th corps, preceded by Wilson Cavalry division, began crossing at
Germanna Ford. The 2nd corps, preceded by Gregg's Cavalry, crossed at Ely's
Ford farther down the river. On the evening of the 4th Warren's Corps Went
into bivouac near the Wilderness Tavern, Sedgwick was between Warren and the
Rapidan; Hancock was near the Cross-Roads at Chancellorsville and Burnside,
with the 9th corps, was moving by a forced march from the Rappahannock river
toward Germanna Ford in response to a telegram from Grant. Wilson's Cavalry
covered both the plank road and the Turnpike West of Warren's Camp, the main
body of the division being at Parker's Store and a small force at
Robertson's tavern on the pike. The orders issued that evening for the
movements of the army on the 5th would indicate that Both Grant and Meade
believed that Lee would fall Back Toward Richmond upon finding his flank
turned by a superior force. In this they were mistaken. Lee had outgeneraled
Hooker on the same ground a year before, and he now decided to make an
effort at least to drive the Federals back across the Rapidan. Therefore, as
soon as he learned on the morning of the 4th that Meade's advance had
crossed the River, Ewell was directed to move by the Orange Turnpike, Hill
by the plank road, and Longstreet was ordered to bring up his corps with all
possible despatch. That Night Ewell was bivouacked about 5 Miles from
Warren's Camp, Hill was at Verdiersville, about 3 Miles in the rear of Ewell,
and Longstreet was at Brock's Bridge, 10 Miles East of Gordonsville.
During the Night Lee Sent Word to Ewell to "bring on the battle now as soon
as possible," and ordered Hill to move forward at the same time as Ewell.
Warren's Orders were to move at 5 a.m on the 5th to Parker's Store and
extend his right toward the Wilderness tavern to connect with the 6th corps.
He moved on time, Crawford's division in advance, Wadsworth's in the center
and Griffin's in the rear. About 7 o'clock Meade received a despatch from
Warren, announcing that the Confederates were in some force on the pike
about 2 Miles West of the Tavern. Meade hurried to the front and directed
Warren to attack with his entire corps to develop what part of Lee's army
was there. Hancock, who was moving to take a position on Warren's Left, was
ordered to halt at Todd's Tavern and await Further Orders. Sedgwick was
ordered to move by A Cross-Road that left the Germanna road at Spottswood,
Attack any Confederate force he might find in his way, and connect with
Warren's Right on the Pike. Grant joined Meade Soon After These Orders were
issued and the two generals established their headquarters on the knoll
around the Lacy House, A little West of the Wilderness tavern.
At 8 o'clock Crawford was in a strong position on the Chewning Farm, where
he was directed to halt until Griffin and Wadsworth were ready to move
against the enemy on the turnpike, when he was to send one of his brigades
to join in the attack. About Noon Griffin attacked vigorously striking Jones
brigade of Johnson's division and driving it back in some confusion through
the supporting line, after which he advanced against Battle's and Doles'
brigades of Rodes' division. Wright of the 6th corps, was to have moved
forward on Warren's Right, but owing to the dense thickets and the uneven
surface of the ground, he was unable to connect with Griffin's line in time
to carry out the original plan of attack. As Griffin advanced, his right
therefore became exposed and Ewell hurled the brigades of Gordon and Daniel
against his flank forcing Ayres' brigade back across the pike. Seeing that
his line was in danger of Being Broken, Griffin then gave the order to fall
back. In executing this order his line was so closely pressed by the
Confederates that he was compelled to abandon 2 pieces of artillery.
Wadsworth, in moving forward through the thickets, lost his direction and
exposed his left flank to Gordon and Daniel, Just After they had forced
Griffin to retire. These two brigades now attacked Wadsworth and drove back
his left in disorder. The Confederates then poured through the gap thus
formed and struck Dennison's brigade of Robinson's division in the flank as
it was moving to Wadsworth's support. Pursuant to Orders Crawford had Sent
McCandless' brigade to join Wadsworth's left, but the latter had begun his
advance before McCandless could reach the position assigned him. The brigade
was moved forward, however, in the direction that McCandless supposed would
bring him into the desired Place, and came up just in time to be engaged by
Gordon's victorious forces after Dennison's defeat. A Sharp Fight ensued,
but McCandless was greatly outnumbered and was finally forced to withdraw
with a severe loss in killed and wounded and the capture of several hundred
of his Men. Ewell then reformed his line on the ground where he was first
attacked and intrenched his position. Warren Fell Back about 300 yards and
formed A New Line with his right resting on the pike.
Early in the Morning Wilson Left Col. Hammond, with the 5th N. Y. at
Parker's Store and pushed on with the rest of his command toward the Craig
Meeting-House. Soon After Wilson's departure Hammond became engaged with
Hill's advance and Crawford threw forward a skirmish line of his infantry to
support the cavalry. This line soon encountered Kirkland's brigade of Heth's
division and with Hammond's regiment was slowly forced back along the plank
road toward the Wilderness Tavern. Getty's division was hurried forward to
the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads, and a despatch was
sent to Hancock directing him to move up on the Brock Road to Getty's
support. Getty reached the Cross-Roads Just in time to secure that important
position, and formed his division in two lines of battle at right angles to
the plank road, Wheaton's brigade in the center, Grant's on the left and
Eustis' on the Right. Hill advanced against this line, but received such a
galling fire that he speedily retired and for the next two hours everything
was quiet, except for the almost constant firing of the skirmishers. When
Hancock received the order at 9 a.m. to halt at Todd's Tavern his advance
was already some 2 Miles beyond that point, and this caused some delay when,
two hours later, he was ordered to move to the support of Getty. At 2 p.m.
Birney's division came up on the Brock Road and formed on Getty's Left in
two lines of battle along that road. The divisions of Mott and Gibbon
followed in order, as fast as the narrow road and dense undergrowth would
permit, and also formed in two lines on the left of Birney. Barlow's
division, on the extreme left, was thrown forward to some high, clear
ground, which was the Only Place Along the line where artillery could be
used to advantage. Here Hancock massed all his batteries except Dow's and
one section of Ricketts', the former of which was placed Near Mott's Left
and the latter on the plank road. As fast as the different commands fell
into position breastworks of logs and earth were thrown up. The second line
also threw up works in the rear of the first, and later a third line was
constructed behind the divisions of Mott and Birney. Before his troops were
in position Hancock received orders to attack, and a little after 3 P.M.
Getty was directed to attack at once, without waiting for Hancock. During
the lull of Two Hours Hill had been industriously pushing his men into
position and forming a junction with Ewell's right. He was anxiously
awaiting and expecting the arrival of Longstreet, but that officer had
delayed his advance, because he was unwilling to take the road assigned him
by Lee, and waited for permission to select his own route. The result was
that when darkness fell on the 5th he was Still Miles away from Hill's
right.
Although Getty received orders about 3 o'clock to attack at once, his
advance was delayed an hour, as he was engaged in shifting Wheaton's brigade
to the right of the plank road to make more room for the 2nd corps. At 4:15
he moved forward down the plank roads, but had not proceeded more than 300
yards when he encountered Heth's division. Ricketts' Guns had advanced with
the line of infantry and did good service in forcing back the enemy's
center, but Hill's line overlapped Getty's flanks and the slight advantage
gained in the center was more than offset by the severe losses on both the
right and left, where the Federal attacks were repulsed, Grant Losing nearly
1,000 men, about one-half of his brigade. Seeing that Getty had met the
enemy in Force, Hancock ordered Birney's and Mott's divisions to his
support, and a little later sent Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division to
the right of the plank road to support Eustis. About 5:30 the enemy charged
and forced back the Union line for 50 yards. One of Ricketts' Guns had to be
abandoned on account of the horses being killed. Some of the Confederates
reached this gun and planted their colors on it, but they were driven away
before they could withdraw it. About the time that this charge was made
Hancock had completed the formation of his line and attacked Hill's right
with great vigor, Smyth's "Irish" brigade driving back the enemy's line for
some distance. In his report Hancock Says: "The battle raged with great
severity and obstinacy until 8 p.m. without decided advantage to either
party." While this was apparently true at the time an hour more of daylight
would have witnessed Hill's defeat. He had extended his lines to the
southward to cover the ground that had been assigned to Longstreet. This
thin line was now shattered and disjointed, and had it been severely pressed
for an hour longer it must inevitably have been broken at some point and the
whole corps driven from the field. During the Action Gen. Hays' commanding
one of Hancock's brigades, was killed; Col. Carroll and Gen. Getty were both
severely wounded, but neither left the field until the fighting was over for
the Day.
In the afternoon some heavy skirmishing Took Place on the Federal right.
About 5 P.M. Ricketts' 2nd brigade, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Truman
Seymour, who had relieved Col. B. F. Smith that morning, Neill's brigade of
Getty's division, and part of Wrights's 1st brigade, Under Col. W. H.
Penrose, attacked the Confederate brigades of Hays and Pegram in a strongly
intrenched position on the ridge south of Net Run. Pegram placed some
artillery on his left, the fire from which enfiladed Neill's line, forcing
him and Penrose to retire from the field with considerable Loss. Seymour
continued the contest until dark, but was unable to dislodge the enemy from
his position. The Federal loss in killed and wounded was heavy on this part
of the Field, Col. Keifer, commanding Seymour's first line, being severely
wounded. On the other Side Gen. Pegram was wounded and compelled to leave
the field.
While these different infantry engagements were going on the cavalry was not
idle. At the Craig Meeting-House Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division
encountered Rosser's brigade of Hampton's cavalry and drove it back about 2
Miles. Rosser was then strongly reinforced and Chapman Fell Back on the 1st
brigade at the junction of the Parker's Store and Catharpin roads. Soon
after this Wilson ordered his whole command to Todd's Tavern, where he had
been directed by Sheridan to Meet Gregg's division. On the way to Todd's he
was closely pressed by the Confederate Cavalry. Gregg arrived at the tavern
about the same time as Wilson, when the two divisions immediately assumed
the offensive and drove the enemy beyond Corbin's Bridge Across the Po
river.
Immediately after the fighting ceased on the 5th, Hancock, Warren and
Sedgwick received orders to attack at 5 o'clock the next Morning. Burnside,
then in the vicinity of Germanna Ford, was instructed to march at 2 a.m.,
with Stevenson's, Potter's and Willcox's divisions, and be in position to
join in the general advance at the hour designated. From prisoners captured
during the Day it was learned that Longstreet was hourly expected and
Hancock was notified to keep a close watch on his left. Barlow's division,
with all the artillery of the 2nd corps, was therefore placed in position to
protect the left flank and a strong skirmish line was thrown out on the
Brock Road. The Federal attack was anticipated by the enemy, who began
firing on both the left and right a few minutes before 5 o'clock. Soon after
the firing commenced, Hancock attacked in two lines, extending across the
Plank Road, Getty's division, with Eustis on the Right, Wheaton in the
center and Grant on the left, supporting the divisions of Mott and Birney,
the latter being in command of Hancock's Right Wing. The Confederates were
pushed back about a mile and a half from the Cross-Roads when Wadsworth's
division came sweeping in from the right, which threw the enemy into
confusion and resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners. The
whole line then pressed on after the almost routed enemy for nearly a mile
farther; Lee's trains and headquarters were in full view and the battle was
nearly won, when a heavy artillery fire was opened on the Union lines from
Poague's batteries masked in the shrubbery on the south side of the road,
and it was learned that one of Longstreet's divisions had finally connected
with Hill's right. In the impetuous advance Hancock's Line had become
somewhat disordered and he ordered a halt to readjust his lines before
engaging the fresh troops. Getty had been wounded during the action and
turned over the command of the division to Wheaton. He was now relieved by
Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division and formed his command along the
original line of battle on the Brock Road. At 7 A.M. Gibbon, commanding the
left wing, was directed to attack the Confederate right with Barlow's
division, but owing to the expected attack by Longstreet the order was but
partially carried out. Frank's brigade only was thrown forward to feel the
enemy's position and after some Sharp fighting it connected with Mott's
Left. About 8 o'clock Stevenson's division of Burnside's Corps reported to
Hancock. Burnside, with his 2nd and 3rd divisions, had been expected to move
by A Cross-Toad Toward Parker's Store, on Birney's right, and attack
simultaneously with the rest of the line. About the time of Stevenson's
arrival at the Brock Road, Hancock received word from Meade that Burnside
had then pushed forward nearly to the store and was ready to attack. This
information proved to be erroneous and was in a measure contributory to the
disaster that overtook Hancock Later in the Day. Burnside was delayed by a
lack of definite information regarding the ground over which he was to move
and the dense thickets he encountered, so that it was 2 p.m. before his
attack was commenced. A few minutes before 9 o'clock Birney, Mott and
Wadsworth, with part of Stevenson's division and three brigades of Gibbon's,
resumed the attack along the plank road and were soon furiously engaged with
the enemy. Just previous to this, rapid firing was heard in the direction of
Todd's Tavern, which Hancock supposed to be the threatened flank attack by
Longstreet, and this caused him to Send Brooke's brigade of Barlow's
division out on the Brock Road to occupy a line of breastworks there to Hold
Longstreet in check. Leasure's brigade of the 9th corps and Eustis' of the
6th were held in readiness to support Barlow. As a matter of fact Longstreet
was at that moment in Hancock's Front, the firing at Todd's Being an
engagement between Sheridan and the Confederate cavalry. In his report
Hancock Says: "The arrangements made on my extreme left to receive
Longstreet prevented me from pushing my success at the time when Gen. Birney
was driving Hill on the plank road."
South of the plank road and nearly parallel to it was the unfinished
Gordonsville & Fredericksburg railroad. About 10 o'clock Longstreet Sent
Gen. Mahone with four brigades to move along the line of this railroad and
Gain Hancock's Flank and rear, while the brigades of Law, Gregg and Benning
engaged the Federals in Front. Mahone First encountered Frank's brigade,
which had nearly exhausted its ammunition and was therefore compelled to
retire before the vehement flank attack. He then struck the left of Mott's
division, which in turn was forced back in some confusion. Heroic efforts
were made to rally the men and reform the line along the plank road by
throwing back the left, but the troops had been engaged all morning under a
heavy fire in the dense forest and their formation was too irregular for
such a movement. At Birney's suggestion the whole line was then withdrawn
and reestablished in the breastworks along the Brock Road. When Longstreet
Saw that Mahone's attack was successful he ordered a general advance along
the plank road, hoping to Crush Hancock's Line. Mahone's men, upon seeing
the Head of the Confederate column, mistook it for a fresh body of Union
troops and fired a Volley, Killing Gen. Jenkins and wounding Longstreet. Lee
then assumed command of his right wing in person and ordered the attack to
be postponed, although the Confederate line was then within a short distance
of the Union works. About half an hour before Mahone Struck the left of
Hancock's Line Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division was driven back to
the open ground near the Lacy House, but Birney Sent Two brigades and
recovered the lost ground, though at considerable loss. During this part of
the Battle Gen. Wadsworth was mortally and Gen. Baxter severely wounded.
From 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. all was comparatively Quiet Along Hancock's Front.
About 2 o'clock Robinson's 1st brigade, Under Col. Lyle, and two regiments
of heavy artillery reported to Hancock and were massed near the Cross-Roads
in reserve. At this time Burnside made an assault on the enemy's line near
the Tapp House, North of the plank road, and drove it back in disorder, but
part of Heth's division and Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's came up as
reinforcements and regained all the lost ground. At 3 P.M. Hancock and
Burnside Both received orders to attack at 6 o'clock. They were not
permitted to wait until that hour, however, for at 4:15 the enemy advanced
against Hancock in force, pressing up to the edge of the abatis, less than
100 yards from the first line of works, where they halted and opened a
fierce fire of musketry. This was continued for half an hour, during which
time the Union line held firm. Then a portion of Mott's division and Ward's
brigade of Birney's gave way. Concerning this Break, Hancock Says in his
report: "The confusion and disorganization among a portion of the troops of
Mott's and Birney's divisions on this occasion was greatly increased, if not
originated, by the front line of breastworks having taken fire a short time
before the enemy made his attack, the flames having been communicated to it
from the forest in front (the battle-ground of the morning), which had been
burning for some hours. The breastworks on this portion of my line were
constructed entirely of logs, and at the critical moment of the enemy's
advance were a mass of flames which it was impossible at that time to
subdue, the fire extending for many hundred paces to the right and left. The
intense heat and smoke, which was driven by the wind directly into the faces
of the men, prevented them on portions of the line from firing over the
parapet, and at some points compelled them to abandon the line."
As soon as Mott's Men Gave Way the Confederates advanced And, some of them
reached the breastworks and planted their colors thereon. But their victory
was of short duration, for Carroll's brigade moved by the left flank,
advancing at the double-quick with fixed bayonets, and drove the enemy back
with heavy loss in killed and wounded, some of the dead being afterward
found inside the Works. Dow's Battery, one section of which was near the
plank road and the others in the second Line Near Mott's Left, did good
service in firing on the enemy, both during his advance and retreat. After
the repulse of the Confederates by Carroll, Lee withdrew his troops from the
contest, and there was no more fighting along the Brock Road that Day, the
order for the attack being countermanded because Hancock's Men were almost
out of ammunition and it was too late to replenish the supply. When Burnside
Heard the firing in Hancock's Front he advanced against the enemy before
him, but his attacks were isolated and unsupported and the only important
result attained was to prevent Heth and Wilcox from moving to Lee's support.
When the attack began in the Morning Wright's division vigorously assaulted
Early's intrenchments in his front, but was repulsed with heavy loss. A
second attack met with no better success, and as the withdrawal of
Burnside's Corps had left Sedgwick's right exposed he was ordered to
intrench his position and act on the defensive. Warren's attacks on Ewell
were also unsuccessful, as the enemy's lines here had been strengthened
during the night and several pieces of artillery added. During the Day
Sedgwick was reinforced by Shaler's brigade, which had been guarding the
trains, and Johnston's brigade was sent to Early. Both sides were thus
reinforced and some Sharp fighting occurred during the afternoon, the
attacks of Warren and Sedgwick Serving to Keep Lee from concentrating his
entire force against Hancock. Just before sunset Gordon's brigade, supported
by Johnston's, made an attack on Sedgwick's Right Flank, While Pegram
engaged the Federals in front. Shaler's brigade was engaged in building
breastworks and the sudden descent of the enemy threw it into confusion,
rolling it back on Seymour's brigade, which also fell into some disorder.
Seymour and Shaler, with several hundred of their men, were captured.
Johnston passed to the left of Gordon and gained Wright's Rear, where he
captured a few prisoners. Wright promptly restored order among the troops
and repulsed the attack of Johnston. Gordon's men were thrown into confusion
and Early ordered both brigades to withdraw. In his Memoir Early says of
this flank attack: "It was fortunate, however, that darkness came to close
this affair, as the enemy, if he had been able to discover the disorder on
our side, might have brought up fresh troops and availed himself of our
condition." This flank attack of Early's was the last important event in the
day's contest, and, in fact, closed the battle of the Wilderness, for when
Federal pickets and skirmishing parties were sent out the next morning no
trace of the enemy could be discovered on the field of the Day before. The
Army of Northern Virginia had retired to its line of intrenchments and the
redoubtable Lee had evidently abandoned his offensive campaign.
The Union loss in the battle of the Wilderness was 2,246 killed 12,037
wounded and 3,383 captured or missing. No doubt many of the wounded were
burned to death or suffocated in the fire that raged through the Woods on
Hancock's Front. Concerning the enemy's casualties Badeau, in his Military
History of U. S. Grant, Says: "The losses of Lee no human being can tell. No
official report of them exists, if any was ever made, and no statement that
has been put forth in regard to them has any foundation but a guess. It
seems however, fair to presume that as Lee Fought outside of his works as
often as Grant, and was as often repelled, the slaughter of the rebels
equalled that in the national army. The grey coats lay as thick as the blue
next Day, when the national scouts pushed out over the entire battle-field
and could discover no living enemy "
Source: The Union Army, vol. 6
