COLD HARBOR, VIRGINIA
June 1-3, 1864
Company F, 126th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, suffered the
following casualties during the Battle of Cold Harbor:
Wallace Shaffer - Wounded June 2, 1864 at Cold Harbor, Virginia
Jacob Weyand - Wounded June 1, 1864 at Cold Harbor, Virginia - Wounded July
9, 1864 at Monocacy, Maryland - Discharged because of wounds on September
23, 1864
Battle Summary:
Cold Harbor, VA., June 1-3, 1864. Army of the Potomac. This was the last
engagement of any consequence in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James,
which began with the battle of the Wilderness on May 5-7. The severe losses
in the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania Court House and along the North Anna
River had made necessary several changes, and the Army of the Potomac on the
Last Day of May was organized as follows: The 2nd Corps, Maj.Gen. Winfield
S. Hancock commanding, was composed of the three divisions commanded by
Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, Brig.Gen. John Gibbon and Brig.-Gen. David B.
Birney, and the artillery brigade Under Col. John C. Tidball. The 5th corps,
commanded by Maj.-Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, included four divisions,
respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens. Charles Griffin, Henry H. Lockwood,
Samuel W. Crawford and Lysander Cutler, and the artillery brigade of Col.
Charles S. WainWright. (On June 2 Crawford's division was consolidated with
Lockwood's.) The 6th Corps, Maj.-Gen. Horatio G. Wright Commanding,
consisted of three divisions commanded by Brig.-Gens. David A. Russell,
Thomas H. Neill and James B. Ricketts, and the artillery brigade of Col.
Charles H. Tompkins. The 9th corps, under command of Maj.-Gen. Ambrose E.
Burnside, was made up of the four divisions commanded by Maj.-Gen. Thomas L.
Crittenden, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox and
Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero, and the reserve artillery Under Capt. John
Edwards. (Ferrero's division was composed of colored troops.) The Cavalry
Corps Under Maj.-Gen. P. Sheridan, consisted of three divisions commanded by
Brig.-Gens.Alfred T. A. Torbert, David Mcm. Gregg and James H. Wilson, and a
brigade of horse artillery Under Capt. James M. Robertson. The 18th corps,
formerly with the Army of the James, commanded by Maj. Gen. William F.
Smith, embraced three divisions, respectively commanded by Brig.-Gens.
William H. T. Brooks, James H. Martindale and Charles Devens, and the
artillery brigade under command of Capt. Samuel S. Elder. This corps was
added to the Army of the Potomac just in time to take part in the battle of
Cold Harbor. The artillery reserve was under command of Brig.-Gen. Henry J.
Hunt. On June 1 Grant's forces numbered "present for duty" 113,875 men of
all arms. The Confederate army under command of Gen. Robert E. Lee, was
organized practically as it was at the beginning of the campaign, (See
Wilderness) with the exception of some slight changes in commanders and the
accession of the divisions of Breckenridge, Pickett and Hoke. Various
estimates have been made of the strength of the Confederate forces at Cold
Harbor. Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, topographer for Lee's army states it as being
58,000 men, which is probably not far from the truth.
Cold Harbor is about 3 Miles North of the Chickahominy river and 11 Miles
from Richmond. Grant considered it an important point as several roads
centered there, notably among them those leading to Bethesda Church, White
House Landing on the Pamunkey, and the several crossings of the Chickahominy,
offering facilities for the movement of troops in almost any direction. On
the Last Day of May Sheridan Sent Torbert's division to drive away from Cold
Harbor the Confederate Cavalry Under Fitzhugh Lee, which was done with
Slight Loss. Gregg's division reinforced Torbert, but the Confederates were
also reinforced and Sheridan Sent Word to Grant that the enemy was moving a
heavy force against the Place and that he did not think it prudent to hold
on. In response to this message Sheridan was instructed to hold on at all
hazards, as a force of infantry was on the way to relieve him. This infantry
force was the 6th corps, which arrived at Cold Harbor at 9 a. m. on the 1st,
just as Sheridan had repulsed the second assault by Kershaw's division, the
rapid fire of the retreating carbines and the heavy charges of canister
proving too much for the Enemy. Wright relieved the cavalry and about 2 p.
m. Smith's corps came up from Newcastle and took position on the right of
the 6th. Both were under instructions to assault as soon as they were ready
but the troops were not properly disposed until 6 o'clock that afternoon.
When Lee discovered that Grant was moving some of his force to the left of
the Federal line, he decided to meet the maneuver by transferring Anderson's
Corps from the Confederate left to the right in order to confront Wright.
Anderson Took position on the left of Hoke, whose division formed the
extreme right of Lee's line. At 6 P. M. Wright and Smith moved forward to
the attack. In their front was an open space, varying in width from 300 to
1,2OO yards, and the moment the first line debauched from the Wood the enemy
opened fire. The troops pressed forward, however, with an unwavering line
until they reached the timber on the farther side of the clearing. Ricketts'
division struck the main line of entrenchments at the point where Anderson's
and Hoke's commands joined, with such force that the flank of each was
rolled back and about 500 prisoners were captured. Smith drove the enemy
from a line of rifle-pits in the edge of the Wood and captured about 250
prisoners, but when he attempted to advance on the main line he was met by
such a galling fire that he was compelled to retire to the Woods, Holding
the first line captured. After trying in vain to dislodge Ricketts the enemy
retired from that part of the works and formed A New Line some distance in
the Rear. Wright and Smith then intrenched the positions they had gained and
held them during the night, though repeated attacks were made by the enemy
in an endeavor to regain the lost Ground. Badeau Says: "The ground won, on
the 1st of June, was of the highest consequence to the national army; it
cost 2,000 men in killed and wounded. but it secured the roads to the James,
and almost outflanked Lee."
In the meantime Lee had assumed the offensive on his Left. Hancock and
Burnside Along Swift Run and Near Bethesda Church were attacked, probably
with a view to Force Grant to draw troops from Cold Harbor to reinforce his
right. Three attacks were also made on Warren, whose corps was extended to
cover over 4 Miles of the line, but each attack was repulsed by artillery
alone. Late in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to withdraw his corps early
that night and move to the left of Wright at Cold Harbor, using every effort
to reach there by daylight the next morning. Grant's object was to make A
General assault as early as possible on the 2nd, Hancock, Wright and Smith
to lead the attack, supported by Warren and Burnside, but the night march of
the 2nd corps in the heat and dust had almost completely exhausted the men,
so that the assault was first postponed until 5 p. m. and then to 4:30 on
the morning of the 3d. The 2nd was therefore spent in forming the lines, in
skirmishing and entrenching. In the afternoon it was discovered that a
considerable Confederate force under Early was in front of the Federal right
and at midnight the orders to Warren and Burnside were modified by directing
them, in case Early was still in their front, to attack at 4:30 "in such
manner and by such combinations of the two corps as May in both your
judgments be deemed best. If the enemy should appear to be in strongest
force on our left, and your attack should in consequence prove successful,
you will follow it up, closing in upon them toward our left; if, on the
contrary, the attack on the left should be successful, it will be followed
up, moving toward our right."
The battle of June 3 was fought on the same ground as the battle of Gaines'
Mill in the Peninsular campaign of 1862 except the positions were exactly
reversed. Lee now held the trenches, extended and strengthened, that had
been occupied by Porter, who, with a single corps, had held the entire
Confederate army at bay and even repulsed its most determined attacks,
inflicting severe loss upon its charging columns, while the Union troops
were now to assault a position which Lee Two Years before had found to be
impregnable. The Confederate right was extended along a ridge, the crest of
which formed a natural parapet, while just in front was a sunken road that
could be used as an entrenchment. Promptly at the designated hour the
columns of the 2nd, 6th and 18th corps moved to the Attack. Hancock Sent
Forward the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon, Supported by Birney. Barlow
advanced in two lines under a heavy fire of infantry and artillery, until
the first line encountered the enemy's line in the sunken road. This was
quickly dislodged and as the Confederates retired over the Crest Barlow's
Men followed, capturing several hundred prisoners and 3 pieces of artillery.
These guns were turned on the enemy, who broke in confusion, leaving the
national forces in possession of a considerable portion of the main line of
works. The Broken Ranks were soon rallied and reinforced, a heavy enfilading
artillery fire was brought to bear on the assailants, and as Barlow's second
line had not come up in time to secure the advantage gained he gave the
order to fall back to a slight crest about 50 yards in the rear, where
rifle-pits were dug under a heavy fire, and this position was held the
remainder of the Day.
Gibbon's division, on the right of Barlow, was also formed in two lines,
Tyler's brigade on the right and Smyth's on the left in the first line,
McKeen's and Owen's on the right and left respectively in the second. As the
division advanced the line was cut in two by an impassable swamp, but the
men pushed bravely on, in spite of this obstacle and the galling fire of
cannon and musketry that was poured upon them, until close up to the enemy's
works. A portion of Smyth's brigade gained the intrenchments, and Col.
McMahon, with part of his regiment, the 164th N. Y., of Tyler's brigade,
gained the parapet, where McMahon was killed and those who were with him
were either killed or captured, the regimental colors falling into the hands
of the Confederates. Owen had been directed to push forward in column
through Smyth's line, but instead of doing so he deployed on the left as
soon as Smyth became engaged, thus losing the opportunity of supporting the
lodgment made by that officer and McMahon. The result was the assault of
Gibbon was repulsed, and the division fell back, taking advantage of the
inequalities of the ground to avoid the murderous fire that followed them on
their retreat. Some idea of the intensity of the fighting on this part of
the Line May be gained from the fact that Gibbon's Command lost 65 officers
and 1,032 men in killed and wounded during the assault. Wright's advance
with the 6th corps was made with Russell's division on the Left, Ricketts'
in the center and Neill's on the Right. Neill Carried the advanced
rifle-pits, after which the whole corps assaulted the main line with great
vigor, but the attack was repulsed with heavy loss. The only advantage
gained - and this a rather dubious one - by the corps was that of being able
to occupy a position closer to the Confederate entrenchments than before the
attack.
A description of the attack by the 18th corps is perhaps best given by
quoting Smith's report. He says: "In front of my right was an open plain,
swept by the fire of the enemy, both direct and from our right; on my left
the open space was Narrower, but equally covered by the artillery of the
enemy. Near the center was a ravine, in which the troops would be sheltered
from the Cross-Fire, and through this ravine I determined the main assault
should be made. Gen. Devens' division had been placed on the right to
protect our flank and hold as much as possible of the lines vacated by the
troops moving Forward. Gen. Martindale with his division was ordered to move
down the Ravine, While Gen. Brooks with his division was to advance on the
left, taking care to keep up the connection between Martindale and the Sixth
Corps, and if, in the advance, those two commanders should join, he (Gen.
Brooks) was ordered to throw his command behind Gen. Martindale Ready to
operate on the right flank, if necessary. The troops moved promptly at the
time ordered, and, driving in the skirmishers of the enemy, carried his
first line of works or rifle- pits. Here the Command was halted under a
severe fire to readjust the lines. After a personal inspection of Gen.
Martindale's front, I found that I had to form a line of battle faced to the
right to protect the right flank of the moving column, and also that no
farther advance could be made until the Sixth Corps advanced to cover my
left from A Cross-Fire. Martindale was ordered to keep his column covered as
much as possible, and to move only when Gen. Brooks moved. I then went to
the front of Gen. Brooks, Line to reconnoiter there. Gen. Brooks was forming
his column when a heavy fire on the right began, which brought so Severe A
Cross-Fire on Brooks that I at once ordered him not to move his men farther,
but to keep them sheltered until the Cross-Fire was over. Going back to the
right, I found that Martindale had been suffering severely. and having
mistaken the firing in front of the Sixth Corps for that of Brooks had
determined to make the assault, and that Stannard's brigade had been
repulsed in three gallant assaults."
On the right the attacks of Burnside and Warren were attended by no decisive
results. The former sent forward the divisions of Potter and Willcox;
Crittenden's being held in Reserve. Potter Sent in Curtin's brigade, which
forced back the enemy's skirmishers carried some detached rifle-pits and
buildIngs, and gained a position close up to the main line, from which the
Federal artillery silenced the principal battery inside the Confederate
works and blew up two of their caissons. Willcox recaptured a line of
rifle-pits from which he had been driven the Day before, Hartranft's brigade
driving the enemy to his main entrenchments and establishing itself close in
their front. In this attack Griffin's division of the 5th Corps Cooperated
with Willcox. Owing to the necessity of placing Artillery in position to
silence the enemy's guns, active operations were suspended until 1 p. m. An
order was therefore issued to the various division commanders in the two
corps to attack at that hour, and Wilson was directed to move with part of
his cavalry division across the Totopotomy, with a view of attacking the
Confederate position on the flank and rear. The arrangements were all
completed by the appointed time and the skirmish line was about to advance
for the beginning of the assault, when an order was received from
headquarters to cease all offensive movements, on account of the general
repulse on the Left.
Meade reported his loss in the battle of Cold Harbor as 1,705 killed, 9,042
wounded and 2,042 missing. As in the other engagements of the campaign from
the Rapidan to the James, no detailed report of the Confederate casualties
was made, but Lee's loss at Cold Harbor was comparatively Slight. Hotchkiss
gives it as "about 1,700." Some of the Federal wounded were brought in at
night by volunteers from the entrenching parties, but most of them lay on
the field, under the hot sun of A Virginia summer, for three days before
Grant would consent to ask permission under a flag of truce to bury the dead
and care for the injured. By that time the wounded were nearly all beyond
the need of medical aid, and the dead had to be interred almost where they
fell. The assault on the 3d has been severely Critcised by military Men.
Gen. Martin T. McMahon, in "Battles and Leaders," begins his article on the
battle of Cold Harbor with the following statement: "In the opinion of a
majority of its survivors, the battle of Cold Harbor never should have been
fought. There was no military reason to justify it. It was the dreary,
dismal, bloody, ineffective close of the Lieutenant-General's first campaign
with the Army of the Potomac, and corresponded in all its essential features
with what had preceded it." Grant, in his "Personal Memoirs" (Vol. II, Page
276), says: "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor
was ever made. * * * No advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the
heavy loss we sustained. Indeed the advantages other than those of relative
losses, were on the Confederate side." After the Battle Grant Turned his
attention to the plan of effecting a junction with Butler and approaching
Richmond from the south side of the James, Along the Lines Suggested by
McClellan Two Years before. The "hammering" process had proved to be too
costly and the army settled down to a regular siege of the Confederate
capital. The campaign from the Rapidan to the James Began with the battle of
the Wilderness on May 5, and from that time until June 10, when the movement
to the James was commenced from Cold Harbor, the Army of the Potomac lost
54,550 men.
Source: The Union Army, vol. 5
